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Abstract 
When the trading process is characterized by search frictions, traders may be rationed so 
markets need not clear. We argue that rationing can be part of general equilibrium, even if it is 
outside its normal interpretation. We build a general equilibrium model where the uncertainty 
arising from rationing is incorporated in the definition of a commodity, in the spirit of the Arrow-
Debreu theory. Prices of commodities then depend not only on their physical characteristics, but 
also on the probability that their trade is rationed. The standard definition of a competitive 
equilibrium is extended by replacing market clearing with a matching condition. This condition 
relates the traders' rationing probabilities to the measures of buyers and sellers in the market 
via an exogenous matching function, as in the search models of Diamond (1982a, 1982b), 
Mortensen (1982a, 1982b) and Pissarides (1984, 1985). When search frictions vanish (so 
matching is frictionless) our model is equivalent to the competitive assignment model of 
Gretsky, Ostroy and Zame (1992, 1999). We adopt their linear programming approach to derive 
the welfare and existence theorems in our environment. 
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1 Introduction
General equilibrium theory is the cornerstone for the analysis of competitive markets. In the theory
of Arrow (1964) and Debreu (1959), trade is represented as a costless process. Any agent seeking to
buy or sell a good at a given point in time can do so at the equilibrium market price. Trade involves
no further costs in terms of time and resources. Search theory on the other hand highlights the
costly nature of the trading process. Since the seminal work of Diamond (1981, 1982b), Mortensen
(1982a, 1982b) and Pissarides (1984, 1985), this theory has become the dominant paradigm to
study labor markets. There workers usually take time and spend resources in order to find a
suitable employer and vice versa, and rationing arises in the form of unemployment. The key
assumption of the Diamond-Mortensen-Pisarides model is that workers and firms must search for
trading opportunities, and the outcome of their search is uncertain. Search frictions are modeled
via an exogenous matching function which describes a random bilateral meeting process between
workers and firms.1 This random process implies that at any point in time some agents will manage
to trade and others will not. Hence, unlike in the Arrow-Debreu model, agents may be rationed in
equilibrium (so markets need not clear), and in general it will take time to trade.
In recent years the general equilibrium literature and the search literature have grown apart,
suggesting that the two approaches cannot be reconciled. This paper aims at building a bridge
between both literatures. Our view is that, while their description of the trading process is markedly
different, the actual gap is narrower than the reading of the literature suggests. Specifically, we
argue that rationing can be part of general equilibrium, even if it is outside its normal interpretation.
The lesson is that the definition of “market clearance” has to be expanded to incorporate the
existence of a trading technology that is not frictionless.
We study a prototypical class of search economies. In the spirit of the Arrow-Debreu theory,
the uncertainty arising from rationing is incorporated in the definition of a commodity.2 Prices of
commodities then depend not only on their physical characteristics, but also on the probability that
their trade is rationed. In a competitive equilibrium, agents take prices as given because they are
infinitesimal relative to the size of the economy. Agents also take as given rationing probabilities,
which are part of the description of a commodity. Markets are anonymous, so prices and rationing
1The matching function gives the measure of bilateral meetings between a worker and a firm as a function of the
aggregate measures of firms and workers in the market, and possibly other variables such as the agents’ search efforts.
2Markets are incomplete because agents cannot insure against this rationing uncertainty.
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probabilities do not depend on the identities of the traders. The departure from the standard
Arrow-Debreu definition of a competitive equilibrium is that market clearing is replaced with a
matching condition which describes a trading technology that is not frictionless. The matching
condition relates the trading probabilities of buyers and sellers to the aggregate measures of buyers
and sellers in each market via an exogenous matching function, as in the Diamond-Mortensen-
Pisarides search model. In equilibrium, prices of commodities adjust so that the optimal decisions
of the agents are consistent with the matching condition.
The matching function captures the presence of external congestion effects in the trading process
which arise from search frictions. Intuitively, as more buyers seek to trade a given good, the
probability that each of them actually trades falls while the probability that a seller trades increases.
Similarly for sellers. In other words, agents seeking to trade impose a negative congestion externality
on traders on the same side of the market and a positive externality on traders on the other side
of the market.
Critically, however, the above external effects are internalized in a competitive equilibrium, so
the equilibrium allocation is constrained efficient.3 Because rationing probabilities are specified in
the definition of a commodity, they are explicitly priced. Hence, when agents choose to trade in a
given market, they pay a price which depends not only on the physical characteristics of the good
but also the probability that its trade is rationed. Suppose, for instance, that the same physical
good trades in two locations. Suppose also that there are fewer buyers per seller in the first location
in equilibrium. If buyers and sellers are expected utility maximizers who are free to choose the
location where they trade, then the good should trade at a higher price in the first location (because
there the probability of trading is higher for buyers and lower for sellers). The fact that the price of
the good differs across locations is not surprising from the general equilibrium perspective since the
objects traded are formally two different commodities (described by their physical characteristics
and the level of “market tightness” or “congestion” at the trading location).
When search frictions vanish (so matching is frictionless) our model reduces to the competitive
assignment model of Gretsky, Ostroy and Zame (1992, 1999). These authors develop a competitive
formulation of the assignment game of Shapley (1955) and Shapley and Shubik (1972) where agents
are infinitesimal relative to the size of the economy. We adopt their linear programming approach
3The definition of constrained efficiency takes into account the fact that the social planner (just like the market)
is restricted by the exogenous matching technology.
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to derive the welfare and existence theorems in our environment.4 To the best of our knowledge, the
linear programming approach has not been used before to study economies with search frictions.
1.1 Related Literature
We are not the first ones to argue that rationing can be incorporated in general equilibrium.
Gale (1996) uses a general equilibrium approach to study the efficiency and existence properties
of competitive markets in the presence of adverse selection. In his model, rationing arises from
incomplete asymmetric (there are no search frictions). Peters (1997) adopts a similar approach
to study a class of economies with search frictions similar to the one in this paper, so his work is
closely related to ours. There is however a key modeling difference with respect to Gale (1996) and
Peters (1997). In those papers, the objects of trade are contracts (involving exactly one buyer and
one seller) which provide a complete specification of the terms of trade, including prices. Prices
then are no longer the variable that adjusts to ensure that individual decisions are consistent with
the underlying matching process. Instead it is trading probabilities that adjust.
In Gale (1996) agents take as given the probability of trading in each of the contract markets,
as well as a belief about the unobservable type of the traders they meet randomly in these markets.
In equilibrium, trading probabilities adjust so the long side of the market is rationed when there is
an imbalance of buyers and sellers. Also, beliefs are rational in all active markets, and in inactive
markets (e.g. for contracts not traded in equilibrium) they are pinned down using refinements
analogous to those used in games of incomplete information.
In Peters (1997), as in our paper, the matching process is exogenous. Given this process, traders
form beliefs about the probability of trading in each of the contract markets. As in Gale (1996),
the condition that beliefs are rational in all active markets replaces the standard market clearing
condition. Beliefs in inactive markets are assumed to be common for all traders and they are
always well-defined. Specifically, traders believe that there many buyers and sellers in all markets,
even if they are inactive in equilibrium. For the case of homogenous buyers and heterogeneous
sellers, Peters (1997) shows that an equilibrium exists and is constrained efficient for a general class
of matching functions under standard assumptions on preferences. More recently, Eeckhout and
4See Makowski and Ostroy (1996, 2003) for other general equilibrium formulations which use the linear pro-
gramming approach. Jerez (2003, 2005), Rahman (2005) and Song (2006) adopt this approach to study the general
equilibrium economies with asymmetric information.
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Kircher (2008) show that these results hold also in environments with two-sided heterogeneity if
the equilibrium allocation entails either positive or negative assortative matching.5
The approach in this paper is different in that the objects of trade specify rationing probabilities
and it is prices that adjust so individual decisions are consistent with the aggregate trading tech-
nology. The two approaches are equivalent as they yield identical equilibrium allocations.6 Thus
they should be viewed as two sides of the same coin. For instance, the equivalent of the assumption
that all traders have the same beliefs in our model is that all traders face the same prices (prices
are anonymous). The equivalent of the assumption that beliefs in all markets (including inactive
ones) are well-defined is that all commodities are priced even if they are not traded in equilibrium.
The latter assumption is standard in general equilibrium models with a continuum of commodities,
like ours (e.g. see Mas-Colell and Zame 1991). Finally, the matching condition in our model is the
equivalent of the generalized market clearing condition in Peters (1997).
Our formulation is perhaps closer in spirit to standard Arrow-Debreu theory in that it fleshes
out the allocating role of prices.7 “Flipping things over” and laying out the model in this more
standard form brings to light several key insights. The first is the connection with the compet-
itive assignment model of Gretsky, Ostroy and Zame (1992, 1999) as the frictionless version of
the model. This implies a crucial methodological advantage because it allows us to adopt their
linear programming approach to establish our results. In particular, it allows us to characterize a
competitive equilibrium and derive the welfare and existence theorems for a general class of search
economies with heterogeneous buyers and sellers regardless of the pattern of matching displayed by
the equilibrium allocation. In these sense, our results generalize those of Peters (1997, 2000) and
Eeckhout and Kircher (2008). Interestingly, the linear programming methodology opens the door
to the use of existing algorithms for computing competitive equilibria in search economies, which
should be particularly interesting in macroeconomic and industrial-organization applications.
Our work is also related to the strategic (game theoretic) formulations of competitive equilibrium
in search environments by Montgomery (1991), Peters (1991, 1997, 2000), Moen (1997), Shimer
(1996), Acemoglu and Shimer (1999), Burdett, Shi, and Wright (2001), Shi (2001), Mortensen and
5Essentially, the match value function is either root-supermodular or it is weakly submodular.
6The welfare theorems derived in Peters (2000) and Eeckhout and Kircher (2008) and in this paper imply that
the set of equilibrium allocations in the two approaches coincides with the set of constrained efficient allocations.
7In this sense, our formulation is closer to Gale (1992), which is a variation of Gale’s (1996) model where agents
choose outcomes taking as given both prices and trading probabilities, and in equilibrium prices and trading proba-
bilities are such that individual decisions are consistent at the aggregate level.
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Wright (2002) and Eeckhout and Kircher (2010), among others. Like Peters (1997) and Eeckhout
and Kircher (2008), our model should be viewed as a reduced form of these strategic equilibrium
notions. In particular, Peters (1991, 1997) provides game-theoretic foundations for the general
equilibrium model. He considers a two-stage game of direct competition with potentially hetero-
geneous sellers and homogeneous buyers. Sellers first simultaneously and publicly offer contracts
to buyers, and buyers then choose among these contracts. To capture the coordination problem
among buyers, it is assumed that all buyers play identical strategies. Peters (1997) shows that,
when the number of traders gets large, the equilibrium allocation of the game coincides with the
competitive equilibrium allocation of a large search economy with an urn-ball matching function.
Also, one set of beliefs that supports the competitive equilibrium allocation coincides with the
sellers’ conjectures in the limit game (who correctly anticipate the effects on buyers’ behavior of
making an off-the-equilibrium-path offer). These results provide a rationale for the general equi-
librium formulation in large search economies, and for assuming an urn-ball matching function in
that formulation.
The literature to which this paper contributes deviates from the original Diamond-Mortensen-
Pisarides model in that prices are determined by a competitive process, and a sufficiently rich
market structure is assumed that allows to internalize the search externalities. The Diamond-
Mortensen-Pisarides model, and a large part of the search literature, assumes instead that each
transaction between a buyer and a seller constitutes a bilateral monopoly. As a result, search
equilibria are typically constrained inefficient in those models.8
2 The Economy
There is a continuum of buyers and sellers of finitely many types, indexed by b ∈ B and s ∈ S,
respectively. The set of agent types is then I = B ∪S, and the population is formally described by
a Borel measure ξ ∈M+(I) with full support.9
There is a finite number of indivisible goods, indexed by h ∈ H. Think of h ∈ H as a list
8Unless the surplus is divided according to the bargaining rule that internalizes the search externalities (see
Diamond 1982b and Hosios 1990).
9Since I is finite, we may write ξ =
∑
i∈I αiδi, where αi ∈ <++ represents the mass of type-i agents in the
population and δi ∈M+(I) represents the Dirac (mass point) measure on i. The total measures of buyers and sellers
are then ξ(B) =
∑
i∈B αi and ξ(S) =
∑
i∈S αi.
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of observable characteristics describing a good. In the labor market example, h is a list of fea-
tures describing a job (e.g. sector, hours worked, tasks performed, location,...). In a housing
market example, h is a list of features describing a housing unit (e.g. location, size, number of
bedrooms/bathrooms, neighborhood, nearby transportation, year of construction...). Goods are
indivisible because agents cannot “perform half of job h” or “buy half of housing unit h”. They
either perform the job (buy the unit) or not. It is possible though that the description of job h′ is
identical to that of job h except that h′ requires half of the hours worked. In our formulation, h
and h′ are two different jobs (say “full time” and “part time”). Finally, it is convenient to include
the autarky choice h0 in H (e.g. the choice to remain unemployed).
In our model, each buyer wants to consume– and each seller can supply– at most one unit of
a good. Agents have von Neumann-Morgernstern preferences. Utility is transferable, so there is
also a divisible numeraire good (available in positive and negative amounts) which yields equal
constant marginal utility to all agents.10 Each buyer type b is characterized by a utility function
vb : H → <+; i.e., vb(h) is the value a type-b buyer assigns to a unit of good h. Each seller type
s is described by a cost (or reservation utility) function vs : H → <+. If seller s does not supply
good h, the convention is to set vs(h) (close) to ∞.11 In the labor market example, if a type-b firm
hires a type-s worker to perform job h, then vb(h) is firm’s productivity and vs(h) is the worker’s
disutility at that job. In the housing market example, if a type-b buyer purchases housing unit h
from a type-s seller, then vb(h) is the buyer’s valuation and vs(h) is the seller’s reservation value
for that unit. Valuations are normalized so vi(h0) = 0 for all i ∈ I.
So far our environment is identical to the continuous assignment model of Gretsky, Ostroy and
Zame (1999). The key difference with respect to that model is that here the trading technology is
not frictionless. In the labor market example, not all workers searching for jobs will find one, and
the same is true for firms searching for workers. Also, a particular job h may be harder to find/fill
that another job h′ (just like certain housing units, say larger ones, may be harder to sell than
others). In general, the probability that buyers and sellers are rationed will depend on the goods
they seek to trade. Rationing probabilities, however, do not depend on the identity (type) of the
traders since markets are assumed anonymous.
10These assumptions are standard in the search literature.
11We keep the range of all valuation functions vi in <+ so we can represent each vi as a vector in the Euclidean
space, vi ∈ <cardH+ . Alternatively, we could use the formulation in Gretsky, Ostroy, and Zame (1999) and identify
seller types with the goods they supply: H ≡ S. The cost of a type-h seller is then represented by a positive scalar
vh ∈ <+. We have chosen the first formulation because it simplifies the description of the environment and the proofs.
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Buyers and sellers seeking to trade a given good meet bilaterally and at random, as in Diamond
(1981,1982a, 1982b), Mortensen (1982a,1982b) and Pissarides (1984,1985). The random meeting
process is described by an exogenous matching function. To ease notation, we assume that the
matching function is the same for all goods.12 Suppose a measure β of buyers and a measure σ of
sellers seek to trade a given good. The matching function M(β, σ) determines the total measure
of bilateral matches as a function of β and σ. It is standard to assume that M : R2+ → R+
is continuous, strictly increasing, concave and homogeneous of degree one. Also, since the total
number of matches cannot exceed the number of traders in the short side of the market,M(β, σ) ≤
min{β, σ}. In particular,M(0, σ) =M(β, 0) = 0. Also, we assume that the Law of Large Numbers
holds, so the probability that a seller meets a buyer is
pi(k) =
M(β, σ)
σ
=M(k, 1) (2.1)
where k = βσ ∈ <+ is the buyer-seller ratio. Likewise, the probability that a buyer meets a seller is
α(k) =
M(β, σ)
β
=M(1, k−1) = pi(k)k−1, (2.2)
Note that α(k) and pi(k) also represent the fractions of buyers and sellers who meet a trading
partner. Conversely, 1−α(k) and 1−pi(k) are the fractions of buyers and sellers who are rationed.
In the search literature it is common to refer to k as the level of market “tightness”. Note that
the function pi(k) is continuous, strictly increasing and concave, with pi(0) = 0 and limk→∞ pi(k) = 1.
On the other hand, α(k) is continuous and decreasing, with limk→0 α(k) = 1 and limk→∞ α(k) = 0.
Intuitively, the higher the buyer-seller ratio then the easier it is for sellers to meet buyers and the
harder it is for buyers to meet sellers. As k goes to infinity (zero) the probability that a seller meets
a buyer goes to one (zero) and the probability that a buyer meets a seller goes to zero (one).
3 The General Equilibrium Model
In this section, we define the commodity space and describe the set of feasible allocations.
Commodities
12Our results extend directly to the case where the matching function differs across goods. Just make the matching
function specified below contingent on each h ∈ H, and denote it by Mh.
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In the spirit of the Arrow-Debreu treatment of uncertainty, we describe commodities both by
their physical characteristics and the uncertainty involved in their trade. Formally, a commodity is
a pair (h, k) ∈ (H|h0)×<+, where h describes the physical good and k is the buyer-seller ratio in
a trading post for good h.13 Unlike in the Arrow-Debreu model, markets are incomplete because
agents cannot insure against this trading uncertainty (e.g. by trading state-contingent claims).
Allocations
An allocation is an assignment of agents to commodities or to the autarky choice. Consider
the space Mc(I ×H ×<+) of compactly supported Borel measures on I ×H ×<+, endowed with
the weak-star topology. Following the measure-theoretic description in Hart, Hildenbrand, and
Kohlberg (1974), an allocation is formally described by a positive a measure µ ∈Mc+(I×H×<+).
This means that, under allocation µ, a measure µ(A,F ) of agents with types i in A are assigned
to a commodity (h, k) in F for arbitrary Borel subsets A ⊂ I and F ⊂ H × <+. It is also useful
to define the marginals (or projections) of µ on the set I of agent types and on the set H × <+
of commodities, denoted by µI ∈ M+(I) and µH×<+ ∈ Mc+(H × <+) respectively. Here M(I)
denotes the set of Borel measures on I. Since I is finite, Mc(I) = M(I), and M(I) is isomorphic to
the Euclidean space (see the Appendix). The commodities exchanged under allocation µ are the
elements (h, k) in the support of µH×<+ with h 6= h0. We denote this support by suppµH×<+ .
Feasible allocations must be consistent with respect to the population ξ. This means that the
total measure of agents of a given type who are assigned to the different commodities or to the
autarky choice must be equal to the measure of such types who are present in the population (see
also Gretsky, Ostroy, and Zame 1999 and Peters 1997):
µI = ξ. (3.1)
Equivalently, µI(A) = ξ(A) for all Borel subsets A ⊂ I.
Feasible allocations must also be consistent with respect to the matching technology. This
requires that the measure of buyers who find a seller must be equal to the measure of sellers who
find a buyer for (almost) all commodities exchanged under allocation µ:
α(k)µ(B, h, k) = pi(k)µ(S, h, k) for almost all (h, k) ∈ suppµH×<+ with h 6= h0. (3.2)
13As is standard, the numeraire good is not made explicit in the definition of a commodity.
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For each such commodity (h, k), there is a measure µ(B, h, k) of potential buyers, a fraction α(k) of
whom find a seller. Hence, the measure of buyers who find a seller is α(k)µ(B, h, k). Similarly, the
measure of sellers who find a buyer is pi(k)µ(S, h, k). Condition (3.2) says that these two measures
are equal.
4 Competitive equilibrium
In this section, we define a competitive equilibrium for the search economy. We then derive the
welfare and existence theorems. We begin by describing the price space.
Prices
A price system is a non-negative continuous linear function on the set of commodities:14
p ∈ C+(H ×<+), (4.1)
where C+(H×<+) is endowed with the topology of uniform convergence on compact sets. That is,
p(h, k) ∈ <+ is the price of commodity (h, k); i.e., the price at which good h is traded in a trading
post where the buyer-seller ratio is equal to k. Prices are normalized so p(h0, k) = 0 for all k; i.e.,
the price associated to the no-trade choice is zero.
Prices then depend both on the physical characteristics of the goods and their associated ra-
tioning probabilities. This is intuitive. If the same physical good is trades in two markets where
the ratio k of buyers to sellers is different, the price of the good will be different in the two markets.
Specifically, the price will be higher in the market where k is lower. Formally, (h, k) and (h, k′) are
two different commodities whose prices will in general be different; i.e., p(h, k) 6= p(h, k′) if k 6= k′.
On the other hand, since p is continuous, “similar commodities” have similar prices (see Mas-Colell
1975). That is, if the same physical good trades in two markets with a similar buyer-seller ratio k,
the price of the good will be similar price in the two markets.
Competitive equilibrium
We are now ready to define a competitive equilibrium.
14Remember that the set of commodities H × <+ is an infinite set. We follow Mas-Colell’s (1975) description of
the price system for economies with a continuum of differentiated commodities. The difference is that, whereas in
his model agents can trade any integer number of units of a given good, here agents trade at most one unit.
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The key assumption is that agents have rational expectations about k, and hence about the
probability with which they will be rationed when they choose to trade commodity (h, k). For a
type-b buyer, the expected utility from commodity (h, k) ∈ H ×<+ is
ub(h, k; p) ≡ α(k)[vb(h)− p(h, k)]. (4.2)
If h 6= h0 the buyer trades with probability α(k), in which case she gets her valuation vb(h) net of
the market price p(h, k). The buyer’s expected utility then increases with the trading probability
(decreases with k) and decreases with the price. Similarly, for a type-s seller, the expected utility
from commodity (h, k) ∈ H ×<+ is
us(h, k; p) ≡ pi(k)[p(h, k)− vs(h)], (4.3)
so it increases with both k and the price p(h, k) for h 6= h0. By assumption, the autarky choice
yields zero expected utility to any agent; i.e., ui(h0,k; p) = 0 for all i ∈ I.
Definition 1. A competitive (price-taking) equilibrium for the search economy is an allocation
µ∗ ∈Mc+(I ×H ×<+) and a price system p∗ ∈ C+(H ×<+) such that:
(i) Agents choose (h, k) ∈ H ×<+ to maximize their expected utility taking p∗as given:
υ∗i (p
∗) ≡ sup
(h,k)∈H×<+
ui(h, k; p
∗) = ui(h∗, k∗; p∗). (4.4)
for almost all (i, h∗, k∗) ∈ suppµ∗.
(ii) µ∗ is consistent with the population:
µ∗I = ξ. (4.5)
(iii) µ∗ is consistent with the matching technology:
α(k)µ∗(B, h, k) = pi(k)µ∗(S, h, k) for almost all (h, k) ∈ suppµ∗H×<+ with h 6= h0. (4.6)
Condition (i) requires that (almost) all buyers and sellers choose to trade a commodity that
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maximizes their expected utility at the equilibrium prices p∗. The expected indirect utility attained
by type-i agents in equilibrium is denoted by υ∗i (p
∗). Condition (ii) ensures that the allocation
is consistent with the population. The difference with respect to the standard definition of a
competitive equilibrium is that, in condition (iii), market clearing has been replaced with the
matching condition (3.2).
In the absence of search frictions, market clearing would require that the measures of buyers
and sellers who trade in each market be equal:
µ∗(B, h, k) = µ∗(S, h, k) for almost all (h, k) ∈ suppµ∗H×<+ with h 6= h0. (4.7)
This implies that k = 1 for all goods which are traded in equilibrium (there is no rationing). Indeed,
when the matching condition in (iii) is replaced by (3.2), our definition of a competitive equilibrium
is equivalent to that in Gretsky, Ostroy, and Zame (1999).
The matching condition in (iii) can also be expressed as
µ∗(B, h, k) = kµ∗(S, h, k) for almost all (h, k) ∈ suppµH×<+ with h 6= h0. (4.8)
using (2.2). Equation (4.8) says the measures of buyers and sellers who choose to trade in each
market in equilibrium generate the exact buyer-seller ratio k that these traders take as given when
they choose to participate in that market. So, as noted above, traders’ beliefs are rational. This
is Peter’s (1997) generalized market clearing condition. This condition is also the parallel of Gale’s
(1996) condition of fulfilled expectations in active markets.
Remark. As in the standard Arrow-Debreu model, the key postulate is that all agents take
prices as given. Moreover, here agents also take as given the buyer-seller ratio in each market, and
hence the associated rationing probabilities. Both the price-taking postulate and the assumption
that agents take rationing probabilities as given are natural in our continuum model. Since the
seminal contributions of Ostroy (1980) and Makowski (1980) an important line of research has
emerged which characterizes competitive economies as those where traders cannot affect prices, even
if they try to.15 Only in these perfectly competitive environments is the price-taking assumption
justified. Gretsky, Ostroy, and Zame (1999) provide a characterization of perfect competition for
15For an insightful survey see Makowski and Ostroy (2001).
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the assignment model. They show that the inability of agents to affect prices is only generic
in environments where agents are infinitesimal. However, having a large economy need not be
sufficient for perfect competition. It is also necessary that there is enough substitutability among
agents present in the economy (for each agent type in the economy, there is another type which is
“sufficiently similar”). In this paper, we have assumed a finite set of buyer and seller types and
a positive mass of each type as this guarantees perfect substitutability among agents of the same
type. Nevertheless, our results can be extended to an environment with a continuum of agent types
and a continuum of goods, as long as B, S and H are compact sets. There the price-taking should
be justified under similar conditions as in Gretsky, Ostroy, and Zame (1999). We have chosen to
make our point in a general environment with finitely many goods and agent types, particularly
because most search models in macroeconomic and industrial-organization applications belong to
this class. This choice also simplifies our proofs.
Welfare Theorems and Existence
In this economy, the planner is restricted by the exogenous matching technology that brings
buyers and sellers together in the market. That is, the planner can choose an assignment µ of
agents to commodities, but unlike in Gretsky, Ostroy and Zame (1992,1999) it cannot choose an
assignment of buyers to sellers of these commodities. The appropriate notion of efficiency is then
that of constrained efficiency.
The total gains from trade from a given allocation µ ∈Mc+(I ×H ×<+):∫
(b,h,k)∈B×H×<+
vb(h)α(k)dµ(b, h, k)−
∫
(s,h,k)∈S×H×<+
vs(h)pi(k)dµ(s, h, k). (4.9)
The first term is the sum of the buyers’ valuations for the physical goods assigned to them un-
der allocation µ. Remember that µ(b, h, k) is the measure of type-b buyers who are assigned to
commodity (h, k). A fraction α(k) of these buyers manage to trade so they receive their valuation
vb(h), while the rest are rationed. Similarly, the second term is the sum of the sellers’ costs (or
reservation utilities) for the goods sold under allocation µ. A measure µ(s, h, k) of type-s sellers
are assigned to commodity (h, k). Yet only a fraction pi(k) of them trade the good, at cost vs(h).
The difference between the first and second term in (4.9) gives the total gains from trade.
The planner’s problem is to choose an allocation that maximizes (4.9) subject to the aggregate
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feasibility constraints (3.1) and (3.2).16 Although the aggregate feasibility constraint (3.2) is dif-
ferent from that in Gretsky, Ostroy, and Zame (1999), as in their model, the planner’s problem is
a linear programming problem. That is, the objective function and the constraints are linear in µ
(i.e., they are just integrals with respect to µ). In the Appendix, we exploit this linear structure
to prove all the results that follow. The first is the existence of constrained efficient allocations.
Theorem 1. A solution to the planner’s problem exists.
The second result is the First Welfare Theorem, and can be proved using a slight variation of
the standard argument.
Theorem 2. (First Welfare Theorem) A competitive equilibrium allocation µ∗ is constrained effi-
cient.
Proof. µ∗ satisfies conditions (ii) and (iii) in the definition of a competitive equilibrium, so it is
a feasible solution for the planner’s problem. Moreover, condition (i) implies that, for almost all
(i, h∗, k∗) in the support of µ∗,
ui(h
∗, k∗; p∗) ≥ ui(h, k; p∗) for all (h, k) ∈ H ×<+.
But then, for any other feasible allocation µ,
∫
(i,h,k)∈I×H×<+
ui(h, k; p
∗)dµ∗(i, h, k) ≥
∫
(i,h,k)∈I×H×<+
ui(h, k; p
∗)dµ(i, h, k).
In words, total expected utility is at least as high under allocation µ∗ than under allocation µ.
Substituting (4.2), (4.3), and the feasibility condition (3.2) with respect to the matching technology
above –and noting that as prices are just transfers which cancel out–yields
∫
(b,h,k)∈B×H×<+
α(k)vb(h)dµ∗(b, h, k)−
∫
(s,h,k)∈S×H×<+
pi(k)vs(h)dµ∗(s, h, k)
≥
∫
(b,h,k)∈B×H×<+
α(k)vb(h)dµ(b, h, k)−
∫
(s,h,k)∈S×H×<+
pi(k)vs(h)dµ(s, h, k).
Hence, µ∗ solves the planner’s problem.
16Note that the planner will only choose allocations where sellers are assigned to the commodities they supply. If
a positive mass of sellers were assigned to a commodity they do not supply (with vs(h) close to ∞), the gains from
trade will be close to −∞. This is cannot be optimal since the autarky choice implies zero gains from trade.
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The Second Welfare Theorem also holds, so any optimal solution µ to the planner’s problem
can be attained as a competitive equilibrium.
Theorem 3. (Second Welfare Theorem) Let µ be an optimal solution to the planner’s problem.
Then there is a price system p ∈ C+(H ×<+) such that (µ, p) is a competitive equilibrium.
Finally, we establish the existence of a competitive equilibrium.
Theorem 4. A competitive equilibrium exists.
As shown in the Appendix, the proofs of Theorems 1, 3 and 4 rely on the fact that the matching
function is continuous (i.e., the functions α(k) and pi(k) are continuous). Since B,S and H are finite
sets, the functions we are integrating over in the planner’s objective function and in the matching
condition (3.2) are continuous functions. This continuity, combined with the fact that the trading
probabilities are monotone in k and bounded above by one, is essentially all we need to prove the
theorems. The same continuity property would arise if the matching function differed across goods
as long as all matching functions are continuous.
5 Relation with Game Theoretic Notions of Competitive Equilibrium
with Search Frictions
The Walrasian equilibrium notion in this paper is a reduced form of the strategic competitive
equilibrium notions in the search literature. In the former, agents maximize their expected utility
taking prices as given, and in equilibrium prices adjust so as to satisfy the matching condition. In
the latter, by contrast, some agents (e.g. sellers) compete by simultaneously posting and committing
to price offers, and other agents (e.g. buyers) observe all the posted offers and direct their search
to the most attractive ones. Agents then behave strategically trying to exploit existing arbitrage
opportunities. In equilibrium, there are no gains from arbitrage.17 The connection between the two
17The equilibrium notion in Mortensen and Wright (2002) is related to ours in that it brings to light the allocating
role of prices. They consider an economy with one good (labor) which may trade in different ”submarkets” with
different levels of market tightness which are explicitly priced. In equilibrium agents select the most preferred
submarket taking as given the set of existing submarket and the prices in these submarkets. Prices adjust so that
the actual level of market tightness in each submarket equals the level that agents take as given. Finally, it is not
possible to open additional submarkets that would attract positive measures of buyers and sellers. The interpretation
is that there are third-party market makers with a profit motive who exploit any arbitrage opportunities by setting
up submarkets.
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approaches is most clearly seen by looking at example economies typically used in the literature.
The vast majority of these examples assume that agents on one side of the market are homogeneous,
while agents on the other side are potentially heterogeneous. The connection best understood in
the context of a static environment.
Example 1. Homogenous workers and homogenous firms. Take the simplest labor market example
where workers and firms are homogeneous and all jobs are alike. There is a measure u of unemployed
workers and a measure ν of vacancies, so kˆ = ν/u is the economy-wide labor market tightness (or
buyer-seller ratio). Suppose for simplicity that ν is fixed (though it is trivial to incorporate free
entry). Any match between a worker and a firm produces output y. The workers’ disutility of
labor is denoted by b < y. The payoffs for workers and firms when they do not find a match are
normalized to zero. The wage ω specifies the division of the match surplus, and is determined
endogenously as a result of the agents’ strategic interaction (see below). Since workers and firms
have always to option of not trading, ω ∈ [b, y]. In addition to the properties described in Section
2, we assume that the matching function M is continuously differentiable and α(k) is convex.
In modeling the competitive game, we follow the approach in Peters (2000), Shimer (1996) and
Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) (but see Moen (1997) for an alternative yet equivalent approach).18
The timing of the game is as follows. In the first stage, each firm simultaneously announces and
commits to a wage offer. In the second stage, workers observe all the announced offers and direct
their search to the most attractive offer (possibly randomizing if they are indifferent). The set
of firms who post a given wage and the set of workers who apply for jobs paying that wage then
meet randomly according to the matching function M. This means that the expected payoff to a
firm who offers wage ω depends on the level of market tightness k that the offer generates, and is
given by α(k)(y − ω). Similarly, the expected payoff to a worker who applies for jobs paying ω is
pi(k)(ω − b). The intuition is that a high wage offer attracts more workers, increasing the firm’s
contact probability and decreasing the worker’s contact probability. All agents take their decisions
optimally based on their common beliefs about the relationship between each potential wage offer
and the market tightness that the offer will generate. Moreover, these common beliefs, denoted by
k(ω), are rational.
The equilibrium of the game is characterized as follows. Let Ω∗ denote the set of equilibrium
wage announcements. Since workers are ex ante identical, in equilibrium they must get a common
18See also the survey by Rogerson, Shimer, and Wright (2005).
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expected payoff Uw∗ ≥ 0; i.e., for all ω∗ ∈ Ω∗,
pi(k∗)(ω∗ − b) = Uw∗, (5.1)
where k∗ is the market tightness level generated by ω∗. The traders’ equilibrium beliefs k∗(ω) then
satisfy (5.1) for ω ∈ Ω∗. The fundamental issue is how beliefs are determined off the equilibrium
path (i.e., for wages not announced in equilibrium). The key assumption is that firms take the
workers’ level of market utility Uw∗ as given, since they are infinitesimal relative to the size of the
market. Using Peters (2000)’s terminology, firms’ payoffs have the market utility property. If a
negligible mass of firms deviates and announces a wage offer ω′ /∈ Ω∗, they will assume that the
deviation has no impact on the workers’ ex ante expected payoff. In particular, their beliefs about
k(ω′) would be based on the assumption that buyers always modify their search strategies in a
way that ensures that they are indifferent between the deviating offer ω′ and the equilibrium offers
ω∗ ∈ Ω∗. In other words, the equilibrium beliefs k∗(ω) satisfy equation (5.1) for all wage offers,
even those not announced in equilibrium. Hence, k∗(ω) coincides with the workers’ indifference
curve associated to Uw∗.
All the above implies that any equilibrium wage announcement must maximize the firms’ ex-
pected payoff subject to the constraint that workers get the market level of utility Uw∗. That is,
each wage ω∗ ∈ Ω∗ and the market tightness k∗ generated by that wage must solve
(ω∗, k∗) = arg max
ω∈[b,y], k∈R+
α(k)(y − ω) s.t. pi(k)(ω − b) = Uw∗. (5.2)
The properties of the matching function imply that this convex problem has a unique solution.
Hence, all firms then announce the same wage ω∗ and all workers seek to find a job at that wage.
Since beliefs are rational, the market tightness generated by ω∗ is then equal to the economy-wide
level of market tightness: k∗ = kˆ. As shown in Figure 1, an interior solution is characterized by
the tangency between the indifference curves of the worker and the firm on the (ω, k) space:
pi(k)
pi′(k)(w − b) = −
α(k)
α′(k)(y − w) . (5.3)
In this case, the equilibrium value of ω∗ solves (5.3) when k = kˆ. Substituting ω∗ and k = kˆ into
(5.1) we obtain the equilibrium value of Uw∗.19
19If ω∗ /∈ [b, y] problem (5.2) has a corner solution which is also easily characterized (either the workers or the firms
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Figure 1 also makes it clear why any ω′ 6= ω∗ cannot be an equilibrium outcome. Suppose it
was, and let k′ be the market tightness generated by ω′. It is easy to find a deviating offer ω′′ with
associated market tightness k′′ satisfying the workers’ indifference condition (5.1), such that the
deviating firms get a higher expected payoff than non-deviating firms. Figure 1 depicts the case
where ω′ > ω∗. Note that ω′′ = ω∗ constitutes a profitable deviation.
A direct consequence of this equilibrium notion is that the equilibrium outcome (ω∗, k∗) lies in
the contract curve, so it is constrained efficient (see Moen 1997). Indeed, substituting α(k) = pi(k)/k
into (5.3) and rearranging yields the well-known Hosios (1990) condition:
y − w
w − b =
η(k)
1− η(k) where η(k) =
pi′(k)k
pi(k)
(5.4)
This condition says that, at a constrained efficient allocation, the firms’ share of the surplus is equal
to the elasticity of the workers’ trading probability pi(k).
It is now easy to see that this constrained efficient allocation is attained in a Walrasian equi-
librium. In this economy, there is a single physical good (labor). A commodity is described by a
level of market tightness k ∈ <+, and a price system is a continuous wage function ω(k). (The
price associated to the autarky choice is again zero). Flipping Figure 1 around we obtain Figure 2.
There we can see that any continuous wage function lying between the indifference curves of the
firm and the worker which is tangent to both indifference curves at (kˆ, ω∗) supports the constrained
efficient allocation. Unlike in the standard Arrow-Debreu model, here there are many supporting
price systems.20 As noted in the introduction, this is a standard feature of models with a con-
tinuum of commodities, where the prices of commodities that are not traded in equilibrium are
indeterminate. A standard selection rule is to take the supremum over the set of supporting price
systems (see Gretsky, Ostroy, and Zame 1999). The selected equilibrium wage function ω∗(k) then
coincides with the worker’s indifference curve, so it is the inverse of the function k∗(ω) specifying
the equilibrium beliefs of the strategic game.
Example 2. Homogeneous workers and heterogeneous firms. Suppose now that there are two firm
types, j = 1, 2, and workers are again homogeneous. Firm types differ in their productivity yj with
y1 > y2 > b. Let νj denote the measure of vacancies at type-j firms.
get a zero expected payoff).
20A related issue arises in Peters’ (1997) general equilibrium model where equilibrium beliefs are indeterminate.
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Consider the interesting case where both firm types trade in equilibrium. An argument anal-
ogous to the one used above implies that any wage ω∗j offered by a type-j firm and the market
tightness k∗j generated by that wage must solve
(ω∗j , k
∗
j ) = arg max
ω∈[b,y], k∈R+
α(k)(yj − ω) s.t. pi(k)(ω − b) = Uw∗, for j = 1, 2, (5.5)
where Uw∗ is again the workers’ equilibrium expected payoff. All type-j firms then announce the
same wage ω∗j . The difference is that now type-1 and type-2 firms may announce different wages.
Given the properties of the matching function, again a unique, constrained efficient equilibrium
exists (e.g. see Moen 1997 and Peters 2000). As shown in Figure 3, the indifference curves of the
two firm types represented on the space (k, ω) satisfy the single crossing property (that of type 1
being steeper than that of type 2). Suppose again that ω∗j lies in the interior of [b, yj ] for each j. Let
x∗ ∈ [0, u] denote the measure of workers who search for a job paying ω∗1. By construction, workers
are indifferent between the wages announced by both firm types. In equilibrium the indifference
curve of type-1 firms is tangent to the worker’s indifference curve associated to Uw∗ at
(
ν1
x∗ , ω
∗
1
)
,
while that of type-2 firms is tangent to the worker’s indifference curve at
(
ν2
u−x∗ , ω
∗
2
)
. That is, the
equilibrium values of ω∗1, ω∗2, x∗ and Uw∗ solve the following system of equations:
α(ν1/x
∗)(ω∗1 − b) = Uw∗, (5.6)
α(ν2/(u− x∗))(ω∗2 − b) = Uw∗, (5.7)
y1 − w∗1
w∗1 − b
=
η(ν1/x
∗)
1− η(ν1/x∗) (5.8)
y2 − w∗2
w∗2 − b
=
η(ν2/u− x∗)
1− η(ν2/(u− x∗)) (5.9)
Again, the above is a Walrasian equilibrium allocation. Figure 3 shows that any continuous
function ω(k) lying between the indifference curves of the worker and the two firm types which is
tangent to the indifference curves of the worker and type-1 firms at ( ν1x∗ , ω
∗
1), and to the indifference
curves of the worker and type-2 firms at ( ν2u−x∗ , ω
∗
2) supports the allocation. Again, there are many
such functions (i.e., ω(k) is indeterminate for k /∈ { ν1x∗ , ν2u−x∗ }). Using the selection rule in Example
1, ω∗(k) again coincides with the worker’s indifference curve (i.e., the inverse of the equilibrium
belief function of the strategic game).
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Example 3. Heterogenous workers and heterogeneous firms. Suppose now that workers are also of
two types, i = 1, 2, with b1 < b2. The indifference curves of the two worker types satisfy the single
crossing property (that of type 1 being steeper than that of type 2). Suppose that y1 > y2 > b2 > b1,
so all potential matches between a worker and a firm are profitable. Let µi be the measure of type-i
workers. For simplicity, assume that ν1 = ν2 = ν.
This third example is more complex because one needs to characterize the matching pattern
that emerges in equilibrium; i.e., which type of worker is assigned to which type of firm (see Peters
1997, Shi 2001, Mortensen and Wright 2002 and Eeckhout and Kircher 2010). Potentially a given
worker type may be assigned to both types of firms and vice versa.21 Once we know the matching
pattern, the appropriate tangency (e.g. Hosios) condition for each worker-firm match together with
the rationality of equilibrium beliefs will determine the equilibrium outcome essentially as above.
As noted by Shi 2001 and Eeckhout and Kircher 2010, the Hosios condition is only necessary but
not sufficient to characterize the equilibrium of the game with two-sided heterogeneity.22
The single crossing property satisfied by the indifference curves of both workers and firms implies
that each equilibrium wage offer ω∗ ∈ Ω∗ attracts a single type of worker (so if two firms of the
same type match with two different worker types they must be posting different wages). Figure 4
illustrates an equilibrium where type-1 firms trade only with type-2 workers and type-2 firms trade
only with type-1 workers. Wages in these two type of matches satisfy the corresponding tangency
condition. Since beliefs are rational, these wages generate market tightness levels k∗1 = ν/u2 and
k∗2 = ν/u1, respectively. In this example, u1 < u2, and so k∗1 < k∗2. For this matching pattern to
emerge in equilibrium it is necessary that type-2 workers are not attracted by the offer ω∗2 of type-2
firms. That is, these workers do not prefer (k∗2, ω∗2) to (k∗1, ω∗1) (so in particular ω∗1 > ω∗2). Similarly,
type-1 workers should not be attracted by the offer of type-1 firms.
Again, this outcome can be decentralized as a Walrasian equilibrium allocation. With our price
21See Shi (2001) for an environment which rules this out.
22We have chosen an example with no complementarities; i.e., the value of matching a type i worker and a type-j
firm is fij = yj − bi and so f11 + f22 = f12 + f21 (see also Mortensen and Wright 2002). See Eeckhout and Kircher
2008 (Figure 2) for a slightly more complicated example with complementarities. Shi 2001 and Eeckhout and Kircher
2010 show that in the presence of complementarities an interesting trade-off that arises between the gains from higher
match values and the losses due to rationing. In particular, Eeckhout and Kircher 2010 consider a general class of
economies with a continuum of buyer and seller types. They show that an equilibrium of the strategic game exists
and is constrained efficient when (i) the match value function is either n¯-root-supermodular where n¯ is determined
by the upper bound of the elasticity of the matching function M, or (ii) it is nowhere n-root-supermodular where
n is determined by the lower bound of the elasticity of M. In case (i) the equilibrium allocation displays positive
assortative matching, and in case (ii) it displays negative assortative matching.
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selection rule, the equilibrium wage function is given by the lower envelop of the workers’ indifference
curves. The first welfare theorem in this paper implies that this allocation is constrained efficient.
In principle, many possible matching patterns could arise in equilibrium. In our simple example,
the equilibrium matching pattern could be identified through trial and error. For a given matching
pattern, there is a candidate equilibrium outcome (i.e., satisfying the Hosios and the rational
beliefs conditions). We just need to check whether there exist prices supporting this outcome. In
more complex environments, the linear programming approach used in this paper will identify the
equilibrium matching pattern. As shown in the Appendix, the equilibrium price associated to any
commodity traded in equilibrium is just the shadow price of the matching condition associated
to that commodity in the planner’s problem. Since the planner’ problem is linear, looking for
equilibrium prices amounts to looking for shadow prices that satisfy the Complementary Slackness
Theorem of Linear Programming. The complementary slackness conditions are the conditions that
an efficient matching pattern must satisfy in addition to feasibility. In applications, the existing
linear programming algorithms will calculate the equilibrium allocation.
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A Appendix
In this section, we follow the linear programming approach in Gretsky, Ostroy and Zame (1992,1999)
to prove Theorems 1 and 3. An alternative proof of Theorem 2 is also provided as a byproduct.
We begin with some necessary notation.
A.1 Notation
For an arbitrary set Z, C(Z) denotes the vector space of continuous real-valued functions on Z,
endowed with the topology of uniform convergence on compact sets. The topological dual of C(Z) is
the space of signed Borel measures on Z which have compact support and are finite on compact sets
(see Hewitt 1959). This space is denoted by Mc(Z), and is endowed with the weak-star topology.
Then C(Z) is also the dual of Mc(Z). We write C+(Z) and Mc+(Z) for the respective positive
cones of these spaces.
Let C(Z) be paired in duality with Mc(Z) with the standard bilinear form:
〈f, γ〉 =
∫
z∈Z
f(z)dγ(z), f ∈ C(Z), γ ∈Mc(Z).
In the special case where Z is compact, the topological dual of C(Z) is the space of signed Borel
measures on Z, denoted by M(Z). If Z is finite, both C(Z) and M(Z) are isomorphic to the
Euclidean space, so the integral above is replaced by a finite sum.
For any integer n, the product spaces
∏
j=1,...,nC(Zj) and
∏
j=1,...,nMc(Zj) (endowed with the
corresponding product topology) are also paired in duality with bilinear form:
n∑
j=1
〈fj , γj〉, (f1, f2, . . . , fn) ∈
∏
j=1,...,n
C(Zj), (γ1, γ2, . . . , γn) ∈
∏
j=1,...,n
Mc(Zj).
Denote the support of an arbitrary measure γj ∈Mc(Zj) by suppγj .
A.2 The linear programming problems
We may write the planner’s problem in Section 4 in a equivalent (more convenient) form.
We first decompose the measure ξ ∈ M+(I) describing the population into a pair measures
(ξB, ξS) ∈ M+(B) × M+(S) which describe the respective subpopulations of buyers and sell-
ers. Similarly, we decompose an allocation µ ∈ Mc+(I × H × <+) into a pair of measures
(µB, µS) ∈ Mc+(B × H × <+) ×Mc+(S × H × <+), where µB describes the assignment of buy-
ers to commodities and µS describes the corresponding assignment for sellers. The corresponding
marginals (or projections) on B and S are denoted by µBB ∈M+(B) and µSS ∈M+(S) respectively.
The marginals on the set of commodities H ×<+ are denoted by µBH×<+ , µSH×<+ ∈Mc+(H ×<+).
With this equivalent description of an allocation, the measure of buyers assigned to commodity
(h, k) is µBH×<+(h, k) = µ
B(B, h, k). Similarly, the measure of sellers assigned to commodity (h, k)
is µSH×<+(h, k) = µ
S(S, h, k). The matching condition (3.2) can then be expressed in terms of the
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marginals µBH×<+ and µ
S
H×<+ :
α(k)µBH×<+(h, k) = pi(k)µ
S
H×<+(h, k) for almost all (h, k) ∈ {H|h0} × <+. (A.1)
It is convenient to extend (A.1) to include the autarky choice by defining
αˆ(h, k) =
{
α(k) if h 6= h0
0 if h = h0
and (A.2)
pˆi(h, k) =
{
pi(k) if h 6= h0
0 if h = h0
(A.3)
Then (A.1) may be written as
αˆ(h, k)µBH×<+(h, k) = pˆi(h, k)µ
S
H×<+(h, k) for almost all (h, k) ∈ H ×<+. (A.4)
With this equivalent description of the population and of an allocation, the problem of the
planner is to find (µB, µS) ∈Mc(B ×H ×<+)×Mc(S ×H ×<+) to solve
(P ) sup
∫
B×H×<+ α(k)v
b(h)dµB(b, h, k)− ∫S×H×<+ pi(k)vs(h)dµS(s, h, k)
s.t.
µBB = ξ
B, (A.5)
µSS = ξ
S , (A.6)
αˆ(h, k)µBH×<+(h, k) = pˆi(h, k)µ
S
H×<+(h, k) for almost all (h, k) ∈ H ×<+, (A.7)
µB, µS ≥ 0. (A.8)
Because the matching function is continuous (i.e., α(k) and pi(k) are continuous), the functions
we are integrating over in the objective function are continuous. Similarly, in the constraint system
(A.7), αˆ(h, k) and pˆi(h, k) are continuous. This continuity property is key in the arguments that
follow. All the arguments extend directly to an economy where the matching function differs across
goods provided all matching functions are continuous.
The objective function and the constraint systems in problem (P ) are linear on (µB, µS). (Re-
member that the marginals are just integrals of the corresponding measures). Formally, problem
(P ) is an equality-constrained linear program (see Anderson and Nash 1987). Standard results in
linear programming theory show that the dual problem for (P ) is also a linear program. Whereas
(P ) is a maximization problem, the dual is a minimization problem. The primal and dual problems
are related because, under certain regularity conditions, the dual variables are also the shadow
prices of the primal constraints and vice versa.
Denote the Lagrange multiplier (or dual variable) associated with constraint (A.5) by qB ∈
C(B), and that associated with (A.6) by qS ∈ C(S). Denote the Lagrange multiplier associated
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with constraint (A.7) by λ ∈ C(H ×<+). The Lagrangian associated with problem (P ) is
L =
∫
(b,h,k)∈B×H×<+
α(k)vb(h)dµB(b, h, k)−
∫
(s,h,k)∈S×H×<+
pi(k)vs(h)dµS(s, h, k)
+
∑
b∈B
qB(b)[ξB(b)− µBB(b)] +
∑
s∈S
qS(s)[ξS(s)− µSS(s)]
+
∫
(h,k)∈H×<+
λ(h, k)[pˆi(h, k)dµSH×<+(h, k)− αˆ(h, k)dµBH×<+(h, k)].
Since αˆ(h0, k) = pˆi(h0, k) = 0, without loss of generality λ(h0, k) = 0 for all k ∈ <+.
Since vi(h0) = 0 for all i ∈ B ∪ S, using (A.2)-(A.3) and rearranging yields
L =
∑
b∈B
qB(b)dξB(b) +
∑
s∈S
qS(s)dξS(s)
−
∫
(b,h,k)∈B×H×<+
[qB(b)− αˆ(h, k)(vb(h)− λ(h, k))]dµB(b, h, k)
−
∫
(s,h,k)∈S×H×<+
[qS(s)− pˆi(h, k)(λ(h, k)− vs(h))]dµS(s, h, k).
The dual problem (D) then consists of finding multipliers (qB, qS , λ) ∈ C(B)×C(S)×C(H×<+)
to solve
(D) inf
∑
b∈B
qB(b)dξB(b) +
∑
s∈S
qS(s)dξS(s)
s.t.
qB(b) ≥ αˆ(h, k)(vb(h)− λ(h, k)) ∀(b, h, k) ∈ B ×H ×<+, (A.9)
qS(s) ≥ pˆi(h, k)(λ(h, k)− vs(h)) ∀(s, h, k) ∈ S ×H ×<+, (A.10)
where again λ(h0, k) = 0 for all k ∈ <+ without loss of generality.23
23Using a more compact notation, the primal problem is to find x = (µB, µS) ∈Mc(B×H×<+)×Mc(S×H×<+)
to solve
(P ) sup 〈x, c〉
s.t. Ax = b,
x ≥ 0.
Here c = (cB, cS) ∈ C(B × H × <+) × C(S × H × <+) is given by cB(b, h, k) = αˆ(h, k)vb(h) and cS(s, h, k) =
−pˆi(h, k)vs(h), and b = (ξB, ξS , 0) ∈M(B)×M(S)×Mc(H×<+). Finally, A : Mc(B×H×<+)×Mc(S×H×<+)→
M(B)×M(S)×Mc(H ×<+) is a continuous linear map defined by A(µB, µS) = (µBB , µSS , αˆµBH×<+ − pˆiµSH×<+).
The dual problem is to find y = (qB, qS , λ) ∈ C(B)× C(S)× C(H ×<+) to solve
(D) inf 〈b, y〉
s.t. A∗y ≥ c,
where A∗ : C(B)×C(S)×C(H×<+)→ C(B×H×<+)×C(S×H×<+) is the adjoint of A. That is, A∗ is defined by
the relation 〈x, (A∗y)〉 = 〈Ax, y〉, for all x ∈Mc(B×H×<+)×Mc(S×H×<+) and all y ∈ C(B)×C(S)×C(H×<+).
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A.3 Existence of optimal solutions and absence of a duality gap
Denote the optimal values for problems (P ) and (D) by ν(P ) and ν(D), respectively. We first show
that both problems are consistent (i.e. their feasible sets are not empty) and bounded (i.e. ν(P )
and ν(D) are finite).
Lemma A. 1. Problems (P ) and (D) are consistent and bounded.
Proof. The autarky allocation µ0 where no one trades is a feasible solution for problem (P ). There
µB0H×<+ and µ
S
0H×<+ are degenerate at (h0,
ξB(B)
ξS(S) ), and µ
B
0B = ξ
B, µS0B = ξ
S . Thus problem (P ) is
consistent. Also, since the gains from trade under autarky are zero, ν(P ) ≥ 0.
In problem (D), set λ = λ0 ∈ C(H × <+) where λ0(h, k) = 0 for all (h, k) ∈ H × <+. In the
constraint system (A.9) and (A.10), αˆ(h, k) and ˆpi(h, k) are bounded above by one. One then can
find a feasible solution where λ = λ0 by choosing q
B
0 ∈ C(B) and qS0 ∈ C(S) so that
qB0 (b) = sup
h∈H
{vb(h)}+ , b ∈ B,
qS0 (s) = sup
h∈H
{−vs(h)}+ , s ∈ S,
for  > 0 small, since the sets H, B and S are finite. Thus problem (D) is consistent. Moreover,
ν(D) ≤
∑
b∈B
qB0 (b)dξ
B(b) +
∑
s∈S
qS0 (s)dξ
S(s) <∞.
Finally, by the weak duality theorem (Anderson and Nash 1987, Theorem 2.1), ν(P ) ≤ ν(D),
so both problems are bounded:
0 ≤ ν(P ) ≤ ν(D) ≤ ∑
b∈B
qB0 (b)dξB(b) +
∑
s∈S
qS0 (s)dξS(s) <∞.
Unlike a finite linear program, a bounded infinite linear program need not have optimal solu-
tions. Moreover, the primal and dual values need not coincide as a “positive duality gap” may
occur (ν(P ) < ν(D)). Below we show that the linear programs in this paper are solvable and
have the same optimal value (ν(P ) = ν(D)). This is all we need to prove the Second Welfare
Theorem and the existence of a competitive equilibrium (see also Gretsky, Ostroy and Zame (1992,
1999)). Our proof follows closely the proof of Theorem 5.2 in Anderson and Nash (1987) on
the Monge-Kantorovich mass-transfer problem (see also Gabriel, Lo´pez-Mart´ınez, and Herna´ndez-
Lerma 2001).24
We first show that problem (P ) is solvable. This establishes Theorem 1.
Theorem A. 1. Problem (P ) has optimal solutions.
24The proof is slightly different from that in Gretsky, Ostroy and Zame (1992, 1999). One reason is that, unlike
in their paper, the measures describing an allocation are defined over a non-compact space (e.g. B ×H ×<+). The
method of proof is similar to that in Jerez (2003), where the same issue arises. The difference is that there the
planner’s problem is a linear semi-infinite programs (e.g. with finitely many constraints), which allows to restrict to
measures with finite support. Proving existence of optimal dual solutions is slightly more involved here.
24
Proof. The feasible set of problem (P ) is bounded, and the constraint map and objective function
are weak-star continuous, so the result follows from Theorem 3.20 in Anderson and Nash (1987).
Next, we show that problem (D) satisfies the well-known Slater regularity condition (e.g. Krabs
1979, Section II.3.3). This implies that there is no duality gap.
Theorem A. 2. There is no duality gap: ν(P ) = ν(D).
Proof. The positive cone of C(B ×H × <+)× C(S ×H × <+) has a non-empty interior, denoted
by Y0. Also, (q
B
0 , q
S
0 , λ0) ∈ C+(B) × C+(S) × C+(H × <+) in the proof of Lemma A.1 is a Slater
point in the feasible set of problem (D). Since ν(D) is finite, Theorem 3.13 in Anderson and Nash
(1987) implies that ν(P ) = ν(D).
By Theorem A.2, the Complementary Slackness Theorem (Anderson and Nash 1987, Theorem
3.2) may be applied to characterize optimal solutions for problems (P ) and (D).
Theorem A. 3. (Complementary Slackness Theorem) Feasible solutions (µB, µS) and (qB, qS , λ)
for problems (P ) and (D) are optimal if and only if they satisfy the complementary slackness
conditions:
qB(b) = αˆ(h, k)(vb(h)− λ(h, k)) for all (b, h, k) ∈ suppµB, (A.11)
qS(s) = pˆi(h, k)(vs(h)− λ(h, k)) for all (s, h, k) ∈ suppµS . (A.12)
As noted by Anderson and Nash (1987), the solvability of problem (D) cannot be settled using
an argument similar to that in Theorem A.1 because C(H × K) is not the dual of any normed
space. We follow their approach and repose problem (D) in a different space, with the required
compactness properties, and then appeal to the continuity of the functions αˆ and pˆi to show that
an optimal solution in the enlarged space lies in the original space. The proof involves three steps.
Lemma A.2 first shows that the set of feasible dual solutions can be taken to be bounded without
loss of generality. The proof uses the fact the sets B, S and H are finite. Lemma A.3 then shows
that the buyer-seller ratio k in all markets can be restricted without loss of generality to lie on a
compact subset K of <+ (e.g. to be bounded above). The proof again appeals to the finiteness of
B, S and H, and also uses the fact that the matching probabilities α(k) and pi(k) are continuous,
pi(k) is strictly increasing, and limk→∞ α(k) = 0. Finally, Theorem A.4 uses the results in Lemma
A.2 and A.3 to establish the existence of optimal dual solutions.
Lemma A. 2. The set of feasible dual solutions can be taken to be bounded without loss of gener-
ality.
Proof. For h = h0, the dual constraint systems (A.9)-(A.10) imply q
B ≥ 0, qS ≥ 0. Also, since
V (D) is finite, there is no loss of generality in assuming that qB and qS are bounded above.
For any given (h, k) ∈ {H|h0}×<+, if an optimal primal solution satisfies µB(b, h, k) = 0 for all
b ∈ B then µBH×<+(h, k) = 0. That is, commodity (h, k) is not traded. The primal constraint (A.8)
then implies that the shadow price λ(h, k) associated to commodity (h, k) can be chosen arbitrarily.
On the other hand, if µB(b˜, h, k) > 0 for some b˜ ∈ B then µBH×<+(h, k) > 0. Substituting (A.2)
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and (A.3) into (A.8) implies pi(k)µSH×<+(h, k) > 0 because α(k) > 0 for all k ∈ <+. This rules out
k = 0 because pi(k) = 0. It also implies that µS(s˜, h, k) > 0 for some s˜ ∈ S. By Theorem A.3,
optimal dual solutions then satisfy
qB(b˜) = α(k)(vb˜(h)− λ(h, k)), (A.13)
qS(s˜) = pi(k)(λ(h, k)− vs˜(h)). (A.14)
using (A.2)-(A.3). Since qB(b˜), qS(s˜) ≥ 0 and α(k), pi(k) > 0, vs˜(h) ≤ λ(h, k)) ≤ vb˜(h). Thus we
may assume
inf
s∈S
vs(h) ≤ λ(h, k) ≤ sup
b∈B
vb(h), (h, k) ∈ H ×<+, (A.15)
without loss of generality. Since B and S are finite sets, the infimum and the supremum in (A.15)
are attained.
Lemma A. 3. If problem (D) is solvable then there exists a compact subset K ⊂ <+ such that,
if all the constraints which are associated with elements (i, h, k) ∈ I ×H × (<+|K) are eliminated
from problem (D), the set of optimal dual solutions does not change.
Proof. Let (qB, qS , λ) be a feasible dual solution. Defining
qB1 (b) = sup
H×<+
{αˆ(h, k)(vb(h)− λ(h, k))}, (A.16)
qS1 (s) = sup
H×<+
{pˆi(h, k)(λ(h, k)− vs(h))}, (A.17)
yields another feasible solution (qB1 , qS1 , λ) (see (A.9)-(A.10)). Suppose that
qB1 (b) > lim
k→∞
αˆ(h, k)(vb(h)− λ(h, k)), ∀h ∈ H,∀b ∈ B, (A.18)
qS1 (s) > lim
k→∞
pˆi(h, k)(λ(h, k)− vs(h)), ∀h ∈ H,∀s ∈ S. (A.19)
Since αˆ(h, k), pˆi(h, k) and λ(h, k) are continuous functions and B,S andH are finite sets, there exists
k¯ sufficiently large such that K = [0, k¯] satisfies the statement in the Lemma A.3 (the constraints
associated with elements (i, h, k) ∈ I × H × (<+|K) do not bind). Suppose the statement in
Lemma A.3 were not true. Then either (i) there is b˜ ∈ B and h˜ ∈ H|h0 such that (A.18) holds
with equality, or (ii) there is s˜ ∈ S and h˜ ∈ H|h0 such that (A.19) holds with equality. The dual
constraint systems associated to h0 can be ignored once we assume q
B, qS ≥ 0 (see the proof of
Lemma A.2).
Take case (i):
qB1 (b˜) = lim
k→∞
αˆ(h˜, k)[vb˜(h˜)− λ(h˜, k)] = 0 (A.20)
since limk→∞ αˆ(h˜, k)→ 0 and λ(h˜, k) is bounded by Lemma A.2. Also, (A.9) implies λ(h, k) ≥ vb˜(h)
for all h and all k ∈ <+ since αˆ(h, k) > 0. On the other hand, qB1 (b˜) is attained at (h0, k) for any
k ∈ <+ by definition. The first possibility is that qB1 (b˜) is not be attained for h˜ and any k ∈ <+.
But then the dual constraints associated to (b˜, h˜, k) do not bind for k ∈ <+ and can be ignored
without loss of generality. Suppose the opposite. There are two cases. The first is that there
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exists k¯(b˜, h˜) sufficiently large so either qB1 (b˜) is not attained for k > k¯(b˜, h˜), or qB1 (b˜) is attained
for k > k¯(b˜, h˜) but µB(b˜, h˜, k) = 0. Theorem A.3 implies that in this case the dual constraints
associated to (b˜, h˜, k) can be ignored without loss of generality for all k > k¯(b˜, h˜). The second
case is that such an upper bound cannot exist. Take an increasing sequence k¯j → ∞. For all j
there then exists kˆj > k¯ such that (b˜, h˜, kˆj) lies in the support of µ
B. This means that the support
of µB the contains the sequence {(b˜, h˜, kˆj)} where lim kˆj → ∞. But this is impossible since this
support is compact by definition and hence bounded in <+. We thus conclude that there exist
k¯(b˜, h˜) such that the constraints associated to (b˜, h˜, k) can be ignored without loss of generality
for all k > k¯(b˜, h˜). For case (ii) a similar argument implies that there exist k¯(s˜, h˜) such that the
constraints associated to (s˜, h˜, k) can be ignored without loss of generality for all k > k¯(s˜, h˜). This
completes our proof since, again, B and S are finite sets.
Theorem A. 4. Problem (D) has optimal solutions.
Proof. Let us repose problem (D) with λ in L∞(H × K) (the dual of L1(H × K)). As before
qB ∈ C(B), qS ∈ C(S) (since C(B) and C(S) are isomorphic to the Euclidean space). The new
dual problem is solvable by Theorem 3.20 in Anderson and Nash (1987) since its feasible set is
bounded (by an argument identical to that in Lemma A.2).
We now show that there exists an optimal solution of the above problem where λ is continuous.
Suppose (qB, qS , λ) is optimal. Feasibility implies
α(k)λ(h, k) ≥ α(k)vb(h)− qB(b), (A.21)
for all b ∈ B, s ∈ S, and (h, k) ∈ (H|h0)×K. Similarly, since pi(k) = α(k)k,
qS(s)/k + α(k)vs(h) ≥ α(k)λ(h, k), (A.22)
for all b ∈ B, s ∈ S, and (h, k) ∈ (H|h0)× (K|{0}). Defining λ1 ∈ B(H ×K) so
α(k)λ1(h, k) = max
b∈B
{
α(k)vb(h)− qB(b)
}
, (h, k) ∈ H ×K, (A.23)
then yields a new optimal solution (qB, qS , λ1). We now show that λ1(h, k) is continuous. For given
(h, k), define
b1 = arg max
b∈B
{
α(k)vb(h)− qB(b)
}
. (A.24)
Since K is compact and α(k) is continuous, α(k) is uniformly continuous on K. For every  > 0
there then exist δ > 0 such that
|α(k)vb1(h)− α(k′)vb1(h)| <  (A.25)
whenever |k′ − k| < δ. Equations (A.21), (A.23), (A.24) and (A.25) then imply
α(k′)λ1(h, k′) ≥ α(k′)vb1(h)− qB(b1) > α(k)vb1(h)− qB(b1)−  = α(k)λ1(h, k)− , (A.26)
for any such k′. Likewise, defining
b′1 = arg max
b∈B
{
α(k′)vb(h)− qB(b)
}
, (A.27)
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there is δ′ > 0 such that
α(k)λ1(h, k) ≥ α(k′)vb′1(h)− qB(b′1)−  = α(k′)λ1(h, k′)− . (A.28)
whenever |k′ − k| < δ′. Hence,
|α(k)λ1(h, k)− α(k′)λ1(h, k′)| <  (A.29)
whenever |k′ − k| < δ0 = min{δ, δ′}. Because both α(k)λ1(h, k) and α(k) are continuous, λ1(h, k)
(the quotient of two continuous functions) is continuous.
A.4 Welfare Theorems
As in Gretsky, Ostroy and Zame (1992,1999), the welfare theorems follow from Theorem A.3. The
theorem implies a direct equivalence between the optimal solutions to problems (P ) and (D) on the
one hand, and competitive equilibrium allocation, prices and indirect utilities on the other hand.
This equivalence implies that the existence of a competitive equilibrium is equivalent to existence
of solutions to problems (P ) and (D).
Theorem A. 5. (Welfare theorems)
(I) Let (µB∗, µS∗, p∗) be a competitive equilibrium. Also, define qB∗(b) = υ∗b (p
∗) for each b ∈ B
and qS∗(s) = υ∗s(p∗) for each s ∈ S, where υ∗i (p∗) is the equilibrium indirect utility of type-i
agents. Then (µB∗, µS∗) solves problem (P ), and (qB∗, qS∗, p∗) solves problem (D).
(II) Suppose (µB, µS) and (qB, qS , λ) are optimal solutions for problems (P ) and (D). Then
(µB, µS , λ) is a competitive equilibrium. Moreover, qB(b) gives the indirect utility of type-b
buyers for each b ∈ B, and qS(s) gives the indirect utility of type-s sellers for each s ∈ S in
equilibrium.
Proof. (I) Let (µB∗, µS∗, p∗) be a competitive equilibrium. Condition (ii) in Definition 1 is
equivalent to (A.5) and (A.6), and condition (iii) is equivalent to (A.7). Also, (µB∗, µS∗) trivially
satisfies (A.8). Hence, (µB∗, µS∗) is feasible for problem (P ).
Define qB∗(b) = υ∗b (p
∗) for each b ∈ B, and qS∗(s) = υ∗s(p∗) for each s ∈ S. Since B and S are
finite sets, qB∗ ∈ C(B) and qB∗ ∈ C(S). By condition (i) in Definition 1,
qB∗(b) ≥ α(k)[vb(h)− p∗(h, k)] for all (b, h, k) ∈ B ×H ×<+,
with equality if (b, h, k) ∈ suppµB∗, and
qS∗(s) ≥ pi(k)(p∗(h, k)− vs(h)) for all (s, h, k) ∈ S ×H ×<+,
with equality if (s, h, k) ∈ suppµS∗. (A.30)
Remember that vi(h0) = 0 for all i ∈ B ∪ S and p∗ is normalized so p∗(h0, k) = 0 for all k ∈ <+.
Hence, (A.30), combined with the definitions in (A.2)-(A.3), implies that (qB∗, qS∗, p∗) is feasible
for problem (D) and satisfies the dual complementary slackness conditions (A.11) and (A.12). By
Theorem A.3, (µB∗, µS∗) and (qB∗, qS∗, p∗) are then optimal solutions for problems (D) and (P ).
(II) Let (µB, µS) and (qB, qS , λ) be optimal solutions for problems (P ) and (D). By Theorem
A.3, these solutions are feasible and satisfy the complementary slackness conditions. As noted
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above, the primal feasibility conditions (A.5) and (A.6) are equivalent to condition (ii) in Definition
1, while the primal feasibility condition (A.7) is equivalent to condition (iii).
Let p ∈ C(H × <+) be given by p = λ. Since p(h0, k) = λ(h0, k) = 0, p satisfies our price
normalization. The dual feasibility conditions (A.9)-(A.10) and associated complementary slackness
conditions (A.11)-(A.12) imply that condition (i) (or equivalently (A.30)) holds for this choice of
the price system. This is just the reverse of the argument in part (I). Moreover, qB(b) gives the
expected utility of type-b buyers for each b ∈ B, and qS(s) gives the expected utility of type-s sellers
for each s ∈ S at these prices. Thus p decentralizes (µB, µS) as a competitive equilibrium.
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